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ABSTRACT 
 
In New York State, there has been a rapid increase in personal injury litigation over the recent 
past.  We show empirically that the tort reform that occurred in the 1980s may be, in part, 
responsible for this phenomenon by increasing the effective structured award that the plaintiff 
receives.  However, despite this generous compensation scheme, some cohorts of plaintiffs may 
still not receive economic justice.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
uring the 1980s and 1990s, several state legislatures passed tort reforms because of increasing liability 
insurance costs.  The intention was often to reduce the amount of litigation.  Some reforms, however, may 
have had the opposite unintended effect.  It has been argued by forensic economists that mandated 
methods for compensating plaintiffs in personal injury litigation may distort settlement negotiations, thus increasing 
the incentives to go to trial (Spizman 2000). 
 
  The rapid growth in the number of attorneys nationwide supports the popular impression that litigation has 
grown dramatically.  In recent years, the growth rate in the number of attorneys has exceeded the growth rate of the 
population. 
 
The number of attorneys in the U.S. increased from 355,242 in 1970 to 954,000 in 2004, a 2.95% per year 
increase.  The U.S. population over this same time period increased from 203 million to 296 million, a 1.12% per 
year increase.  This phenomenon is especially pronounced in New York State where the number of attorneys 
increased from 48,312 in 1970 to 142,538 in 2004, a 3.22% per year increase.  Over this same time period, New 
York‟s population only increased from 18.237 million to 19.190 million, a .15% per year increase (Statistical 
Abstracts).   
 
This increase in the number of attorneys may be caused by a change in the magnitude of compensation 
attorneys receive for representing plaintiffs at trial which is a fixed percentage of the award.  There is a greater 
incentive to litigate if the calculation of compensation results in an overstatement of economic loss.  If an injured 
person incurs losses that have a true present value of $X and that person is awarded an amount exceeding $X, then 
over-compensation occurs.  If this procedure is systematic rather than occasional, it will be in both the injured 
party‟s and attorney‟s self interest to litigate.  Lawsuits of marginal value may be undertaken because the expected 
financial return outweighs the risk.   
 
During the mid-1980‟s, the New York State legislature passed the Article 50-B statute that altered the 
procedure for reducing future economic damages to present value.  This statute has been controversial since its 
inception.  Several authors have argued that Article 50-B has a pro-plaintiff bias.  Wolkoff and Hanushek (1995) and 
Lambrinos and Harmon (1995) examine hypothetical situations in which they compare the present value of the 
award under 50-B with the true present value of damages suffered by the plaintiff.  They find that under the vast 
majority of cases, Article 50-B over-compensates the plaintiff by 60 to 140 percent.  Spizman and Dunn-Schmitt 
(2000) have mathematically demonstrated that the present value of the 50-B structure is always greater than the true 
D 
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present value of damages suffered by the plaintiff.   
 
The Public Policy Institute of New York State (“An Accident and a Dream”, 1995) also note that this well-
intentioned reform increased legal costs.  We agree with these conclusions.  In this paper, we illustrate the nature of 
the over-compensation through a numerical example and then explore the factors that influence the degree of over-
compensation under 50-B.   
 
A NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION 
 
 Jury awards are typically comprised of a past and a future component for a variety of categories of loss, 
such as wages, fringe benefits, pain and suffering, and medical expenses.  For expositional ease, we consider a 
potential jury award made solely for future medical expenses that will be incurred by the plaintiff.   
 
Suppose the medical expert will testify that the plaintiff will incur medical expenses over a 20 year period 
with medical expenses of $100,000 in year one.  Furthermore, medical expenses will grow by 4.5% per year over 
this period.  Future lifetime medical expenses are shown in Table 1 in the amount of $3,137,142.  If the award for 
future medical expenses is given as a lump-sum payment, economic theory requires that future losses be reduced to 
their present values.  Assuming a market interest rate of 5%, the present value of these cash flows amounts to 
$1,821,007, as shown in Table 1.  If $1,821,007 were invested today at a 5% interest rate, the plaintiff would be able 
to pay for the costs of future medical care over the next 20 years. 
 
 
Table 1:  True Present Value 
 Year  Actual Cost  Present Value  
 1  $100,000  $95,238  
 2  $104,500  $94,785  
 3  $109,203  $94,333  
 4  $114,117  $93,884  
 5  $119,252  $93,437  
 6  $124,618  $92,992  
 7  $130,226  $92,549  
 8  $136,086  $92,108  
 9  $142,210  $91,670  
 10  $148,610  $91,233  
 11  $155,297  $90,799  
 12  $162,285  $90,367  
 13  $169,588  $89,936  
 14  $177,220  $89,508  
 15  $185,194  $89,082  
 16  $193,528  $88,658  
 17  $202,237  $88,235  
 18  $211,338  $87,815  
 19  $220,848  $87,397  
 20  $230,786  $86,981  
  Total $3,137,142  $1,821,007  
 
 
Article 50-B does not provide a structured settlement based entirely on trial testimony.  The procedure is 
rather convoluted.  The following steps are employed.  First, future lifetime medical expenses are computed at trial 
($3,137,142).  Second, $250,000 of the future damages is paid as a lump sum.  Third, an annuity is then created for 
the remaining amount by subtracting $250,000 from the $3,137,142 total award, yielding $2,887,142.  Fourth, this 
remainder is divided by the time frame over which the jury made the award (20 years), yielding a first year annuity 
payment of $144,357.  This is shown in Table 2.   
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Table 2:  Calculation of First-year Annuity under Article 50-B 
Actual total lifetime cost:    $3,137,142 
- First $250,000 paid now:    $    250,000 
Amount to be annuitized:    $2,887,142 
/ Number of years:               20 
First year annuity:    $   144,357 
 
 
Fifth, although medical inflation has already been accounted for, the statute requires the first year annuity 
of $144,357 with an incremental increase of 4% per year over the entire period, as shown in Table 3.  The present 
value of this annuity amounts to $2,514,538 as shown in Table 3.  Under 50-B, the combined present value is 
$250,000 + $2,514,538 = $2,764,538.  The Article 50-B statute results in a pro-plaintiff bias since the present value 
of the award under 50-B exceeds the true present value by $943,531 ($2,764,538 - $1,821,007).  The percentage by 
which the present value under 50-B exceeds the true present value of losses (percent overpayment) is $943,531 / 
$1,821,007 = 51.8%.   
 
 
Table 3:  Present Value under Article 50-B 
 
Year 
 
Annuity 
 
Present Value 
 
 
1 
 
$144,357 
 
$   137,483 
 
 
2 
 
$150,131 
 
$   136,174 
 
 
3 
 
$156,137 
 
$   134,877 
 
 
4 
 
$162,382 
 
$   133,592 
 
 
5 
 
$168,877 
 
$   132,320 
 
 
6 
 
$175,633 
 
$   131,060 
 
 
7 
 
$182,658 
 
$   129,811 
 
 
8 
 
$189,964 
 
$   128,575 
 
 
9 
 
$197,563 
 
$   127,351 
 
 
10 
 
$205,465 
 
$   126,138 
 
 
11 
 
$213,684 
 
$   124,936 
 
 
12 
 
$222,231 
 
$   123,747 
 
 
13 
 
$231,120 
 
$   122,568 
 
 
14 
 
$240,365 
 
$   121,401 
 
 
15 
 
$249,980 
 
$   120,245 
 
 
16 
 
$259,979 
 
$   119,099 
 
 
17 
 
$270,378 
 
$   117,965 
 
 
18 
 
$281,193 
 
$   116,842 
 
 
19 
 
$292,441 
 
$   115,729 
 
 
20 
 
$304,139 
 
$   114,627 
 
    
Total   $2,514,538 
        
 
50B Present Value of annuity: 
 
$2,514,538 
 
 
+ Lump-sum payment $250,000: 
 
$   250,000 
 
 
Total 50-B Present Value: 
 
$2,764,538 
  
 
FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE PERCENT OVERPAYMENT 
 
The percent overpayment is not fixed but rather a function of the age of the plaintiff as well as medical 
inflation and discount rates.  Let T = number of years into the future that the plaintiff will incur medical expenses, m 
= medical inflation rate, and d = discount rate.  The first year medical expense is assumed to be $100,000
1
.  The true 
present value of the future medical expenses (PVTrue) can be expressed as
2
: 
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The present value of all payments made by the defendant under 50-B (PV50B) can be expressed as
3
: 
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The percent overpayment (PO) can be expressed as: 
 
PO = Percent Overpayment = 
True
TrueB
PV
PVPV 50
= 
True
B
PV
PV50
 − 1 (3) 
 
This may be rewritten as (4). 
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 We are interested in examining how PO is influenced by changes in the variables T, m and d.  Given the 
difficulty of finding and signing the following partial derivatives: 
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m
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We have chosen to draw inferences about these partial derivatives by varying the values for each variable, 
one at a time, holding the values of the other variables constant.  In Table 4, we compute percent overpayment for 
various levels of m, T and d.  We vary the discount rate and medical inflation rate from 4% to 7%.  We also vary the 
time horizon of the future payments from 10 to 50 years in 10 year increments.  The evidence provided in Table 4  
 
suggests 0


T
PO
, ,0

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m
PO
 and  0


d
PO
.  
 
 
Table 4:  Percent Overpayment 
 
10 Years Discount Rate 
Medical Inflation 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 
4.0% 21% 22% 24% 25% 
5.0% 21% 23% 24% 26% 
6.0% 22% 23% 25% 26% 
7.0% 22% 24% 25% 27% 
 
 
20 Years Discount Rate 
Medical Inflation 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 
4.0% 49% 51% 52% 54% 
5.0% 51% 53% 55% 57% 
6.0% 53% 55% 57% 59% 
7.0% 55% 57% 60% 62% 
 
 
30 Years Discount Rate 
Medical Inflation 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 
4.0% 87% 89% 90% 92% 
5.0% 92% 95% 98% 100% 
6.0% 97% 101% 105% 109% 
7.0% 103% 108% 113% 118% 
 
 
40 Years Discount Rate 
Medical Inflation 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 
4.0% 138% 139% 141% 142% 
5.0% 149% 153% 158% 162% 
6.0% 161% 168% 176% 183% 
7.0% 172% 183% 194% 205% 
 
 
50 Years Discount Rate 
Medical Inflation 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 
4.0% 206% 207% 208% 210% 
5.0% 228% 236% 243% 251% 
6.0% 251% 265% 280% 295% 
7.0% 273% 295% 318% 343% 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Under statute 50-B, we have demonstrated, through an illustration, that the value of PO is always positive.  
In New York State, therefore, if plaintiffs prevail at trial, the structured award received will exceed the true 
economic loss and increase the incentive to litigate relative to states that structure the award based on the true 
present value.  This explains, in part, the more rapid growth of attorneys in New York State than nationwide. 
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 Clearly, the incentive to litigate in New York State is greater than in other states.  This incentive is most 
pronounced when the time horizon is longest, which occurs for young plaintiffs.  For example, given a medical 
inflation rate and discount rate of 6%, there will be an overpayment of 25% for a plaintiff with a life expectancy of 
10 years.  This contrasts with an overpayment of 280% for a plaintiff with a 50-year life expectancy.  We would 
expect the demographic composition of the litigation pool in New York State to be more heavily weighted with 
younger individuals.  Similarly, we would expect the incentive to litigate in New York State to be greater during 
periods of high inflation, which results in high medical inflation and discount rates. 
 
Finally, there is the issue of justice for the plaintiff.  If the defendant paid attorney fees in addition to the 
economic damages, a PO of 0% would make the plaintiff whole; that is, the plaintiff would receive the necessary 
amount of dollars to pay future medical expenses, but in New York State, the plaintiff is obligated to pay attorney 
fees out of the award.  Assuming that attorney fees are 1/3 of the award, a PO of 50% is necessary to make the 
plaintiff whole.  For example, if the true present value is $100, a 50-B present value of $150 allows for an attorney 
fee of $50 and provides the plaintiff with the remainder of $100.  We see from Table 4 that a percent overpayment 
of approximately 50% occurs when the time horizon is 20 years.  This suggests that even in a progressive state, such 
as New York, older plaintiffs (those with life expectancies of fewer than 20 years) will not receive adequate 
compensation to make them whole.  Only younger plaintiffs will receive an award that just compensates or over-
compensates them for their injury.   
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ENDNOTES 
 
1
It can be shown that, for all intents and purposes, the analysis is invariant with respect to the magnitude of the first 
year payment. 
2
This expression is valid as long as d ≠ m.  When d = m, PVTrue = [FYC / (1 + m)] T. 
3
This expression is valid as long as d ≠ .04.  When d = .04, a similar adjustment to that shown in Endnote 1 is made. 
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